Ex-ante dynamic network tariffs for transmission cost recovery by Savelli, Iacopo et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
10
08
6v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
Y]
  2
3 J
ul 
20
19
Ex-ante dynamic network tariffs for transmission cost recovery
Iacopo Savellia,∗, Antonio De Paolaa, Furong Lia
aDepartment of Electronic and Electrical Engineering, University of Bath, UK
Abstract
This paper proposes a novel tariff scheme and a new optimization framework in order to address the recovery of fixed
investment costs in transmission network planning, particularly against rising demand elasticity. At the moment, ex-post
network tariffs are utilized in addition to congestion revenues to fully recover network costs, which often leads to over/under
fixed cost recovery, thus increasing the investment risk. Furthermore, in the case of agents with elastic market curves, ex-post
tariffs can cause several inefficiencies, such as mistrustful bidding to exploit ex-post schemes, imperfect information in applied
costs and cleared quantities, and negative surplus for marginal generators and consumers. These problems are exacerbated
by the increasing price-elasticity of demand, caused for example by the diffusion of demand response technologies. To
address these issues, we design a dynamic ex-ante tariff scheme that explicitly accounts for the effect of tariffs in the long-
term network planning problem and in the underlying market clearing process. Using linearization techniques and a novel
reformulation of the congestion rent, the long-term network planning problem is reformulated as a single mixed-integer
linear problem which returns the combined optimal values of network expansion and associated tariffs, while accounting for
price-elastic agents and lumpy investments. The advantages of the proposed approach in terms of cost recovery, market
equilibrium and increased social welfare are discussed qualitatively and are validated in numerical case studies.
Keywords: transmission network expansion; fixed cost recovery; network tariffs and charges; lumpy investment; bilevel
program;
Nomenclature
Sets and Indices
F¯m set of possible lumpy capacity expansions for line m, with F¯m =
⋃
j∈J F¯m,j
i index of a discrete tariff level, with i ∈ I
I set of discrete tariff levels
j index of a lumpy capacity expansion, with j ∈ J
J set of lumpy capacity indices
k index of a consumer, with k ∈ ΩDt
ℓ index of a loop, with ℓ ∈ L
L set of loops
m index of a line, with m ∈M
M set of lines
n index of a node, with n ∈ N
N set of nodes
p index of a producer, with p ∈ ΩGt
t index of a time period, with t ∈ T
T number of time periods
T set of time periods, with T = {1, ..., T}
ΩDt,n set of consumers in node n
ΩDt set of all consumers, i.e., Ω
D
t = ∪nΩ
D
t,n
ΩGt,n set of producers in node n
ΩGt set of all producers, i.e., Ω
G
t = ∪nΩ
G
t,n
Parameters
am,n element of the network incidence matrix AM×N . It holds am,n = 1 (am,n = −1) if the positive
power flow on line m exits (enters) from node n. In all other cases, am,n = 0
dmaxt,k maximum quantity demanded by consumer k at time t
F 0m existing capacity on the line m
F¯m,j lumpy capacity expansion for line m, with j ∈ J
gmaxt,p maximum quantity offered by producer p at time t
Kfixm fixed cost of building or expanding line m
Kvarm variable cost of building or expanding line m
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p˜Dt,k bid demand price by consumer k at time t without network costs
p˜Gt,p bid offer price by producer p at time t without network costs
δm,n allocation factor for cost distribution among market participants
τ¯m,i discretized transmission tariff applied on line m, with i ∈ I
ψℓ,m element of the sensitivity matrix ΨL×M representing the reactance of line m in loop ℓ.
ωt weighting factor.
Functions
Bk(dt,k) benefit function for consumer k
Cp(gt,p) cost function for producer p.
Variables
bFm,j binary variable equal to one if the lumpy investment in additional capacity F¯m,j for line m is made,
and zero otherwise
bτm,i binary variable equal to one if the tariff τ¯m,i is applied on line m, and zero otherwise
dt,k accepted demand for consumer k at time t
ft,m flow in the line m at time t
gt,p accepted generation for producer p at time t
pDt,k bid demand price by consumer k at time t including network costs
pGt,p bid offer price by producer p at time t including network costs
τm transmission tariff applied on line m
um binary variable equal to one if line m is expanded, and zero otherwise.
Dual variables and associated constraint
πt,n power balance constraint at time t in node n
γt,ℓ Kirchhoff’s voltage law constraint for loop ℓ at time t
µmaxt,m maximum flow constraint at time t in line m
µmint,m minimum flow constraint at time t in line m
ϕ
D,max
t,k maximum demanded quantity constraint for consumer k at time t
ϕ
G,max
t,p maximum offered quantity constraint for producer p at time t
Auxiliary variables
y
bFµ,max
t,m,j it replaces the product b
F
m,jµ
max
t,m
y
bFµ,min
t,m,j it replaces the product b
F
m,jµ
min
t,m
yb
τd
t,m,i,k it replaces the product b
τ
m,idt,k
y
bτg
t,m,i,p it replaces the product b
τ
m,igt,p
1. Introduction
In the near future, an unprecedented amount of network investments will be necessary to accommodate the substantial
shifts in generation and demand caused by increasing penetration of renewable energy resources, and electrification of
transportation and heating [1]. As a result, the estimated cost for transmission investments in the next 15 years amounts to
1.7 $ trillion worldwide [2]. In this scenario, it is of paramount importance that current paradigms for transmission network
planning are properly updated to sustain the development of a sound, secure, and affordable energy system. Along this line,
a comprehensive survey on theoretical and practical advancements in transmission investment and planning methodologies,
from both an economic and an engineering point of view, is reported in [3]. Some of the most relevant issues that are currently
being tackled include: determining efficient methods for combined transmission/generation expansion [4], accounting for
impact of large-scale wind integration under uncertainties [5, 6], and developing new investment paradigms for transmission
expansion in deregulated power markets [7, 8, 9].
A key general aspect of transmission expansion planning that still exhibits several unresolved issues is the full and
efficient recovery of the investment costs and in particular of fixed costs [10]. This is a well-known problem that has been
analysed extensively [11]. One of the first proposed solution from a general economic perspective has been the introduction
of Ramsey pricing [12], which has been further analysed in a power system context by Boiteux in [13] and [14]. However,
this approach only considers monopolies in a fully-regulated environment and does not include market interactions between
generation and demand. Several alternative approaches have been proposed, such as two-part tariffs [15, 16], and non-linear
pricing methods [17, 18]. Despite these contributions, the recovery of fixed costs remains a topic with several open questions
[19, 20]. Currently, network expansion costs are recovered through congestion revenues and network tariffs. The latter
are necessary as the congestion rent component alone is not sufficient to guarantee the recovery of the fixed investment
costs, unless a significant underinvestment is performed [21]. However, these network tariff schemes are applied ex-post,
without accounting for their effect on both price-sensitive consumers and producers [22]. This means that the clearing
process in electricity markets does not properly consider the effect of network tariffs on the accepted quantities and on the
market clearing prices. This approach can lead to several inefficiencies, such as cleared orders which result in a negative
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surplus and mistrustful biddings due to the risk of distorting the participants behaviour [23]. These issues are becoming
particularly relevant nowadays, because demand is no longer perfectly inelastic, and consumers are moving towards a flexible
and price-sensitive behaviour [24, 25, 26].
The aim of this paper is to address these issues and present a novel framework for optimal network expansion that
utilizes ex-ante tariffs to ensure full recovery of investment costs (both their fixed and variable components). The proposed
formulation explicitly includes tariffs in the investment optimization and market clearing problem. This allows to properly
accommodate bids and offers of price-elastic participants (i.e. generators and demand) which under the current ex-post
tariffs may be subject to sub-optimal market outcomes and allocation inefficiencies [23]. These results are obtained by
characterizing the network expansion problem as a non-linear mixed-integer bilevel optimization. In this formulation, the
upper level depicts the long-term investment planning problem: the overall social welfare is maximized while recovering
investment costs from tariffs (determined dynamically) and congestion rent. In turn, the lower level represents a short-
term market clearing problem which takes into account the presence of network tariffs. By using standard integer algebra,
complementarity properties, and a novel reformulation of the congestion rent, the proposed bilevel model is recast as
a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) which can be solved with off-the-shelf solvers without resorting to any iterative
algorithm.
To summarize, the main novelties of the proposed approach are:
• utilization of ex-ante network tariffs, to properly account for price-elastic market participants;
• dynamic optimal distribution of investment cost recovery between congestion rent and tariffs, with improvements on
overall social welfare;
• new formulation of the network planning problem as a bilevel optimization and design of equivalent MILP formulation
to facilitate numerical resolution;
• a novel characterization of the congestion rent, which can be recast as a linear expression of dual variables when lumpy
investments are considered.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main issues in transmission investment
cost recovery. In particular, the following problems are discussed: i) the recovery of fixed costs, ii) the presence of lumpy
network investments, and iii) the effect of tariffs on price-sensitive market participants. Section 3 and 4 introduce the
proposed formulation of ex-ante tariffs and the bilevel model for network planning, respectively. Section 5 recasts this model
as an equivalent, single MILP problem and Section 6 presents two case studies to show the main properties of the proposed
approach. Finally, Section 7 outlines the main conclusions.
2. Transmission Planning: model and challenges
The problem of network expansion is commonly analysed under a regulated centralized paradigm [8]. The network
expansion is determined by a central network planner with the purpose of maximizing the total social welfare of the system.
This scheme can be formulated analytically through the following optimization problem [9]:
max
dt,k,gt,p,
um,ft,m,Fm
∑
t∈T
( ∑
k∈ΩDt
Bk(dt,k)−
∑
p∈ΩGt
Cp(gt,p)
)
−
∑
m∈M
um
(
Kfixm +K
var
m Fm
)
(1a)
∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dt,k −
∑
p∈ΩGt,n
gt,p +
∑
m∈M
am,nft,m = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N (1b)
∑
m∈M
ψℓ,mft,m = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀ℓ ∈ L (1c)
ft,m ≤ F
0
m + umFm ∀t ∈ T , ∀m ∈M (1d)
− umFm − F
0
m ≤ ft,m ∀t ∈ T , ∀m ∈M , (1e)
with um ∈ {0, 1}, 0 ≤ dt,k ≤ dmaxt,k , 0 ≤ gt,p ≤ g
max
t,p , ft,m ∈ R, and Fm ≥ 0. With this approach, the central planner
must determine which lines m are expanded (through the binary variable um) and the amount of additional capacity on
these lines (through the continuous variable Fm). The values of um and Fm are selected in order to maximize the objective
function in (1a), which represents the total social welfare of the system and corresponds to the difference between two main
components: i) short-term benefits, equal to the difference between demand benefits B and generation costs G, and ii) long-
term investment costs, i.e. the costs of expanding each line m by an additional capacity Fm. The investment costs include
a fixed component Kfixm (incurred if um = 1 and line m is expanded) and a variable component K
var
m Fm (proportional to
the additional capacity Fm). The social welfare optimization is subject to the power balance constraint (1b) at each node
n and the Kirchhoff’s voltage law (1c) on each loop l of the considered network. In addition, constraints (1d) and (1e) set
line flow limits, imposing that the power flow ft,m (at each time period t and on each line m) does not exceed the maximum
line capacity F 0m + Fm available after the network expansion, where F
0
m is the existing capacity.
This centralized formulation, which is commonly considered a starting point in analytical studies on network planning,
exhibits some relevant drawbacks, which are discussed in the rest of this section.
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2.1. Recovery of fixed and variable investment costs
The network expansion investment can be recovered through the congestion rent (CR) collected on the transmission
lines. Denoted by πt,n the locational marginal price at node n at time t, i.e. the Lagrange multiplier associated to constraint
(1b), the CR can be expressed as follows:
CR =
∑
t∈T
(πt,nrm − πt,nsm)ft,m (2)
where nsm, n
r
m ∈ N denote the sending and receiving node of branch m, respectively. A key issue of recovering costs
exclusively through the congestion rent CR is that such approach does not recover fixed costs, even tough the objective
function (1a) accounts for both the fixed and the variable investment costs. The reason is that the solution obtained in (1)
maximizes the social welfare of all the participants, which is composed by three components: i) the consumer surplus, ii)
the producer surplus, and iii) the congestion rent [26]. If the optimal solution of (1) envisages a certain network expansion
(i.e. um = 1), it follows that the resulting investment cost is lower than the associated social welfare increase. However,
there is no guarantee that the cost (in both its fixed and variable components) will be entirely covered by the CR, which
only constitutes one component of the social welfare. For the specific case with F 0m = 0 (to neglect previous investments),
the total congestion rent CR in (2) is exactly equal to the variable costs, regardless of the network topology [21]:
CR =
∑
m∈M
Kvarm Fm. (3)
As a consequence, when the transmission system operator is entitled to collect only the congestion rent, the fixed costs Kfixm
of the optimal planned network expansion returned by (1) cannot be recovered, despite the fact that the expansion actually
generates sufficient welfare to cover all the costs.
To further emphasize this point, consider problem (1) over a single time period for the simple 2-node network in Fig. 1,
whose demand and supply curves are depicted in Fig. 2.
Figure 1: Topology of the 2-node system.
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Figure 2: Demand curve in blue and supply curve in red for first (left) and second (right) market zones.
If no connection exists between the two zones, the market clearing price in the first zone is 80 £/MWh, and 20 £/MWh
in the second zone. In the first zone, for each price lower than 80 £/MWh, some consumers would be willing to buy, but not
enough producers are willing to produce at these prices. However, this excess demand can be satisfied by importing energy
from the second zone. Define the import curve for the first zone as the horizontal (energy) difference between the demand
and supply curves in the first zone. This curve is depicted as the blue line in Fig. 3 for prices lower than 80 £/MWh.
Similarly, in the second zone, for each price greater than 20 £/MWh, some producers would be willing to produce, but not
enough consumers are willing to buy. This excess supply can be exported. Define the export curve as the horizontal (energy)
difference between the supply and the demand curve in the second zone. This amount is depicted as a red line in Fig. 3 for
prices greater than 20 £/MWh. The curves reported in Fig. 3 are useful to represent the congestion rent. Suppose now that
the two zones are connected by a transmission line with a maximum capacity of 15 MW. Assuming a time period of 1 hour,
the energy traded between the two zones is 15 MWh. In this case, the congestion rent is represented by the grey area in
Fig. 3, where the market price is equal to 60 £/MWh in the first zone and 30 £/MWh in the second zone. The triangular
part above the congestion rent is the welfare increase due to the importing consumers, whereas the triangular part below
the congestion rent represents the increase in welfare due to the exporting producers. The triangular area labelled by L is
the dead-weight loss, i.e., the loss of social welfare caused by the flow limit. The solid line in Fig. 4 represents the difference
between the price curves depicted in Fig. 3. It means that the same deductions in terms of congestion rent and dead-weight
loss can be obtained by using this curve.
For this simple case with a single time period, the condition ft,m = Fm must hold [21], and relationship between
congestion rent and investment costs can be graphically represented as in Fig. 4. In model (1), the total investment cost
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Figure 3: The blue curve represents the import demand curve, given by the horizontal difference between the demand curve and supply curve in
zone 1. The red curve depicts the export supply curve, given by the horizontal difference between the supply curve and demand curve in zone 2.
The grey area is the congestion rent, whereas the triangular area marked by L is the dead-weight loss due to the flow limits.
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Figure 4: The solid line represents the price difference between the import and export curves in Fig. 3. The horizontal dotted line is the average
variable costs (i.e. Kfixm = 10 £/MWh), whereas the dashed hyperbole depicts the ATC in (4).
(TC) corresponds to the last term in (1a) and is defined as TC =
∑
m∈M um(K
fix
m +K
var
m Fm). In this two-zone example,
the average total cost (ATC) per unit of added line capacity (if the investment is made, i.e. um = 1), is defined as follows:
ATC =
TC
Fm
=
Kfixm
Fm
+Kvarm (4)
For Kfixm = 200 £/MWh and K
var
m = 10 £/MWh, the ATC are depicted as the dashed hyperbole in Fig. 4, whereas
the horizontal dotted line represents the average variable costs, that are constant and equal to Kvarm in problem (1). The
optimal capacity expansion for the optimization problem (1) corresponds to the x-value of the intersection between the
average variable costs (dotted line) and the price differential among the two zones (solid line) when the added line capacity
is equal to Fm. In the considered case, the optimal line expansion is equal to 25 MW and the associated price difference
between the two zones is 10 £/MWh. The congestion rent and the variable costs are both represented by the grey rectangular
area, and take the same value of 250 £. However, at this optimal solution of (1), the ATC (dashed hyperbole in Fig. 4)
is equal to 18 £/MWh and the total costs amount to 450 £. As previously discussed, the investment in this case does not
recover the fixed costs Kfixm , equal to 200 £. In order to recover both the fixed and variable costs, the following revenue
adequacy condition must be added to problem (1):
CR ≥ TC =
∑
m∈M
um(K
fix
m +K
var
m Fm) . (5)
The solution of (1) with this additional constraint is represented in Fig. 5. In this case, the optimal expansion corresponds
to the x-value of the intersection between the price differential curve (solid line) and the ATC (dashed line), which also
accounts for averaged fixed costs. The optimal value implies an energy exchange of 20 MWh. The rectangular grey area is
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Figure 5: This figure depicts the same curves as in Fig. 4. The grey rectangular area and the triangular yellow area correspond to the congestion
rent CR and the value loss L.
the congestion rent, which is exactly equal to the total costs, and amounts to 400 £. The consequence of constraint (5) is a
reduction of the inter-zone exchange from 25 to 20 MWh. The triangular yellow area, labelled by L, is the reduction in the
objective function. The revenue adequacy constraint, by imposing full recovery of the investment costs through congestion
rent, leads to underinvestment (from Fm = 25 MW to Fm = 20 MW), and to a reduction of the overall social welfare of
25 £.
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2.2. Lumpy investments
In practice, the capacity expansion on transmission lines cannot take any arbitrary value and, instead, can only correspond
to a finite set of possible discrete options. This complicates the formulation and resolution of problem (1), as the continuous
decision variables Fm are replaced by binary variables, with a significant computation burden increase. Moreover, lumpiness
of capacity expansions exacerbates the issue of fixed cost recovery and sub-optimality of the resulting solution. Consider
again the example presented in Section 2.1 and assume now that the feasible line expansions must take values in the finite
set D = {3 MW, 6 MW, . . . , 30 MW}, with a discrete step of 3 MW between each option. This means that the previous
optimal solution of 20 MW is not feasible any more. In this case of lumpy investments, the optimal solution corresponds to
further under-investment and a capacity expansion of 18 MW, as depicted in Fig. 6. The TC are represented by the grey
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Figure 6: Effect of lumpy investment. The traded energy is limited to 18 MWh. The total cost are represented by the are labelled by TC. The
transmission system operator collects an extra-profit from the congestion rent, equal to the red area on top of the total costs. The decrease in
the objective function is represented by the yellow area labelled by L.
area. Note that the transmission system operator collects an extra-profit from the congestion rent, equal to the red area
above the total costs. The further decrease in the objective function is represented by the yellow area L, and amounts to
24 £.
Proposition 1. In the presence of fixed costs, if the transmission operator revenue is limited to congestion rent, the optimal
planning problem can lead to a sub-optimal state for consumers and producers. Lumpy investment exacerbate this issue.
However, consumers and producers could be willing to bear some costs to compensate the network operator, as long as the
achievable solution leads to a greater surplus.
2.3. Network tariffs and price-sensitive market participants
In the previous section, it has been shown that the recovery of fixed costs in transmission planning problems through
congestion rent leads to under-investments and suboptimal solutions. To avoid these undesired outcomes, one alternative
option is to directly recover these costs from generators and consumers, which have benefited from the social welfare increase
of the investment. This is generally obtained by introducing ex-post tariffs, i.e. additional payments from generation and
demand after the market clearing. However, this solution also presents relevant drawbacks and it can lead to suboptimal
solutions. Consider in fact that demand and supply market curves in day-ahead markets are price-elastic [27]. That is,
consumers and producers buy and sell different quantities at different prices. For consumers, the greater the price, the
smaller the quantity they are willing to buy. Conversely, for producers, the greater the price, the greater the quantity
they are willing to supply. A fundamental consequence of having market participants with price-sensitive bids is that any
additional cost (applied after the market clearing process has been determined) can lead to a negative surplus for some
participants.
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Figure 7: Single-zone market with demand depicted as a blue line, and supply represented as a stepwise red curve. The supply curve is determined
by the bids submitted to the market by three producers, labelled by A, B, and C, respectively. The intersection of the demand and supply curves
yields the market price, i.e., 10 £/MWh. Assuming perfect competition, the producers submitted bids are their marginal costs. Therefore, the
profit of producer B is zero, as it both collects and pays 10 £/MWh.
To see this, consider the single-zone market depicted in Fig. 7. The stepwise red curve represents the supply market
curve, and it is composed by the three bids submitted by the producers A, B, and C. Assuming perfect competition, the
bids represent the (constant) marginal costs of the producers, and are equal to 0, 10, and 20 £/MWh for A, B and C,
respectively. The blue line depicts the demand curve. The market price is determined by the intersection of the demand
and supply curves, and is equal to 10 £/MWh. All the offered quantities by producer A are accepted and it sells 10 MWh of
energy. Given the market price of 10 £/MWh and the marginal cost of zero, the profit of producer A is 100 £. By contrast,
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the quantity offered by producer C is not accepted, because its marginal cost is strictly greater than the market price,
formally, the bid order of producer C is out-of-the-money [28]. Producer B is the marginal producer [21], and its bid order
price (i.e., its marginal cost) sets the market price. This means that producer B collects 100 £ as revenues for selling 10
MWh at 10 £/MWh, but it pays 10 £/MWh for each unit produced, therefore its profit is zero. This holds for any marginal
producer with constant marginal cost. Now, suppose that an ex-post network tariff T = 5 £ is charged to producers. As a
consequence of this extra cost, producer B pays 105 £ and collects only 100 £. In other words, the ex-post network tariff
translates directly into a 5 £ loss. It could be argued that, if producer B knew in advance about the tariff T = 5 £, it could
rise the submitted price to 10.5 £/MWh for its traded energy of 10 MWh. However, this implies a priori knowledge of the
market clearing solution, which is not the case in a properly functioning market with price-taker participants. These results
hold for any marginal entity, and can be extended to a more general settings. Recall in fact that, under a nodal pricing
framework, if there are n congested lines, then there will be n+ 1 marginal units [29]. More generally, if ex-post tariffs are
applied, any units whose surplus is smaller than the ex-post tariff will incur in a loss.
Proposition 2. As long as market participants have elastic market curves, network tariffs should be considered directly
into the clearing process. This would allow to properly account for consumers and producers price-sensitive behaviour, and
it would avoid the execution of orders which could results (ex-post) in a negative surplus.
3. Ex-ante dynamic network tariffs
To overcome the drawbacks of ex-post tariffs, discussed in Section 2.3, a new type of ex-ante tariff is presented. This
novel cost-recovery scheme is directly considered into the market clearing process and is related to the traded quantities.
Under the proposed framework, the function Tp(gt,p) represents the network costs charged to generator p and Cp(gt,p)
corresponds to its generation cost function. Then, the total costs to be paid by p are Cp(gt,p) + Tp(gt,p) and the marginal
total cost pGt,p is defined as follows:
pGt,p(gt,p) =
∂Cp(gt,p)
∂gt,p
+
∂Tp(gt,p)
∂gt,p
(6)
where gt,p is the produced quantity. The marginal total cost p
G
t,p represents the bid price the producer p should submit to
the market under perfect competition. The key feature of this novel formulation is that, by considering Tp, the effect of
network charges is directly embodied in the producer’s bid price.
Similarly, assume that the function Tk(dt,k) represents the network costs charged to consumer k, and Bk(dt,k) its benefit
function before network charges. Then, the net benefit for the consumer k amounts to Bk(dt,k)−Tk(dt,k). In this case, the
actual marginal benefit pDt,k is:
pDt,k(dt,k) =
∂Bk(dt,k)
∂dt,k
−
∂Tk(dt,k)
∂dt,k
(7)
where dt,k is the cleared demand. The value p
D
t,k represents the bid price the consumer k should submit to the market under
perfect competition.
The fundamental aspect of this new approach is that the effect of network costs is considered before the actual market
clearing takes place, through the inclusion of ex-ante tariffs Tp and Tk. Note that these tariffs directly affect the submitted
bid prices, which in turn can modify the market equilibrium (as long as market participants are price-sensitive). This means
that tariffs must be determined by using an optimization planning problem that considers also the market clearing process,
to properly account for their effect on both prices and quantities.
In the proposed formulation (fully detailed in Section 4.1.1), the charged network costs are expressed as linear functions
of generation and demand, with Tp(gt,p) :=
∑
m∈M τmgt,p, and Tk(dt,k) :=
∑
m∈M τmdt,k, where τm is the tariff applied to
line m. Therefore, the conditions (6) and (7) can be recast as follows:
pGt,p = p˜
G
t,p +
∑
m∈M
τm , p
D
t,k = p˜
D
t,k −
∑
m∈M
τm (8)
That is, the bid profile of the generator p is obtained by shifting its marginal costs over the price axis by a positive offset,
whereas the bid profile of the consumer k is obtained by shifting its gross marginal benefit over the price axis by a negative
offset to account for tariffs to be paid, as depicted in Fig. 8. The initial market clearing solution (q1, p1) with market price
p1 = 10 £/MWh and accepted power q1 = 15 MW, is changed by the introduction of tariffs, and takes the new values
(q2, p2) for quantity and power, respectively, as depicted in Fig. 8. Note how the introduction of tariffs reduces the cleared
quantity. This quantity belongs to price-sensitive consumers and producers who suffer a loss when the tariffs are applied
ex-post, and therefore it is not accepted when the tariffs are considered ex-ante.
The key point of the proposed scheme is to provide a mathematical approach to exactly embed network costs (e.g. tariffs)
into participants’ bid profiles, which are then reflected into the cleared quantities and market prices. In turn, quantities
and market prices are used to compute the congestion rent collected by the transmission system operator, which is therefore
affected by the selected tariffs. This means that, in the presence of price-sensitive market participants, accepted quantities,
market prices, tariffs and congestion rent are dynamically linked, and all these values must be considered simultaneously
when a network investment planning problem is solved. For this reason, the proposed scheme is termed ex-ante dynamic
network tariffs.
Proposition 3. Network costs, such as tariffs, should result in marginal costs of the form as in (6) and (7), in order to be
directly representable by their submitted market bid orders before the actual market clearing takes place.
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Figure 8: Assume generation marginal costs as depicted by the red dashed line, marginal benefit before network costs as represented by the dashed
blue line, and a network tariff of 2 £. Then, the resulting demand and supply curves are depicted by the blue and red solid lines, respectively.
4. Network planning problem
In order to address the issues of traditional network planning approaches, highlighted in Section 2, a novel planning
paradigm is presented. The purpose of this new formulation is to determine network expansions that maximize the social
welfare of the system while explicitly accounting for price-elastic participants and lumpiness of investments. Ex-ante dynamic
network tariffs are used to ensure optimal recovery of both fixed and variable investment costs.
4.1. Bilevel program for network planning
In order to account for ex-ante dynamic tariffs, the proposed network planning model is structured as a bilevel program
[30]. A bilevel model can be regarded as two nested optimization problems, termed upper and lower level problem. Formally,
it is defined as follows:
max
u∈U
F (u, x∗) (9a)
s.t. x∗ ∈ argmax
x∈X
f(x;u) , (9b)
where F is the objective function of the upper level problem (9a), f is the objective function of the lower level problem
(9b), and U , X are constraint sets. The variables x∗ represent the optimal solution of the lower level problem, which
depends on the upper level variables u, i.e., x∗= x∗(u). One important characteristic of a bilevel model is that all the upper
level variables u enter the lower level as parameters. This feature can be exploited to recast a bilevel model as a single
mathematical optimization program when specific conditions hold [31], as detailed in Section 5.1. Bilevel programming
is extensively used in the field of game theory to model Stackelberg problems [32]. However, in power system economics,
nested optimization structures are often used to access dual variables [33, 34, 28, 35], which are related to market prices
according to the marginal pricing theory [36].
The proposed bilevel framework for optimal network planning, with dynamic ex-ante tariffs for full cost recovery, is
sketched in Fig. 9. The lower level represents the day-ahead market clearing problem, whereas the upper level represents
the long term investment planning problem. The objective of the upper level is to determine the optimal investment plan
Market prices pit,n,
flows ft,m, and
quantities dt,k , gt,p
Investment
decision um,
lumpy expansion bFm,j ,
and charge τm
Lower Level
• Objective
Max social welfare
• Purpose
Market clearing
Upper Level
• Objective
Max social welfare
considering investment costs
• Purpose
Enforce revenue adequacy condition
Determine line tariff
Determine line expansion
Figure 9: Bilevel structure of the proposed formulation for optimal network planning.
by considering both the social welfare and the investment costs, while enforcing the revenue adequacy condition, i.e. the
recovery of both fixed and variable costs. In the proposed framework, the transmission operator collects both the congestion
rent, and the tariffs applied to consumers and producers. The key decision variables of the upper level problem are: i) the
investment decision um, ii) the selected lumpy capacity expansion b
F
m,j, and iii) the tariffs τm. Having fixed these quantities,
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the lower level problem actually clears the market, while directly accounting for network tariffs into the clearing process.
As a result of the clearing process, the market prices πt,n, the flows ft,m, the executed quantities dt,k and gt,p are obtained,
which are used by the upper level problem to compute the transmission operator revenues, which are compared with the
investment costs to verify the revenue adequacy condition.
The fundamental feature of the proposed approach is the explicit inclusion of the network tariffs τm in the lower level
market clearing process, in order to account for price-sensitive market participants. Since consumers and producers have
elastic market curves, they will demand and offer different quantities at different prices.
4.1.1. Upper Level
The upper level problem represents a long term investment planning problem, and is formulated as follows:
max
um,b
F
m,j ,τm
pDt,k,p
G
t,p
∑
t∈T
ωt
( ∑
k∈ΩDt
p˜Dt,kdt,k −
∑
p∈ΩGt
p˜Gt,pgt,p
)
−
∑
m∈M
(umK
fix
m +K
var
m
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF¯m,j) (10a)
∑
j∈J
bFm,j = um ∀m ∈M (10b)
pDt,k = p˜
D
t,k −
∑
m∈M
umτmδm,n ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N , ∀k ∈ Ω
D
t,n (10c)
pGt,p = p˜
G
t,p +
∑
m∈M
umτmδm,n ∀t ∈ T , , ∀n ∈ N , ∀p ∈ Ω
G
t,n (10d)
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
n∈N
ωt
(
− am,nπt,nft,m + umτmδm,n
( ∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dt,k +
∑
p∈ΩGt,n
gt,p
))
≥
∑
m∈M
(umK
fix
m +K
var
m
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF¯m,j)
(10e)
um ∈ {0, 1} , b
F
m,j ∈ {0, 1} , τm ≥ 0 , p
D
t,k ∈ R , p
G
t,p ∈ R. (10f)
The objective function (10a) represents the long term social welfare and accounts for both the fixed investment cost Kfixm
and variable cost Kvarm . The term ωt is a weighting factor to consider the different time periods involved. The term F¯m,j
represents the lumpy expansion on line m. In the proposed framework, the line capacity can be increased only by a finite set
of discretised quantities F¯m =
⋃
j∈J F¯m,j . Constraint (10b) ensures that only one value of F¯m,j is selected if the investment
is made. Constraints (10c)-(10d) introduce the effect of network tariffs into the problem. For the case of demand in (10c),
the actual marginal benefit pDt,k of the consumer k at time t is reduced by a quantity τm (i.e. the imposed tariff) with respect
to its initial gross benefit p˜Dt,k. Equivalently, the market demand curve is reshaped to account for the additional costs. A
similar formulation is used for generators in (10d), where τ appears with a plus sign since costs (rather than benefits) are
considered. In this case, the tariffs increase the producer costs, and the market supply curve is reshaped accordingly. The
market curves determined by using pDt,k and p
G
t,p, which embed network costs, will be used by the lower level problem to
perform the market clearing. Note that the network tariffs τm do not appear in (10a), because they are paid by consumers
and producers and collected by the network operator to recover the investment costs, therefore these monetary flows offset
each other in (10a).
Remark 1. The term δm,n in (10c)-(10d) represents an allocation factor to account for possible different network cost distri-
butions between the participants. For example, a postage stamp-like allocation method could be enforced by imposing δm,n = 1
∀m,n. Alternatively, network distribution factors could be used to account for the different impact of demand/generation at
each node on the individual power flows. Negative values of δm,n imply that a credit is collected.
Constraint (10e) ensures the revenue adequacy of the network expansion. The terms−am,nπt,nft,m refer to the congestion
rent (the minus sign is due to the sign convention of am,n). The remaining terms in the left-hand-side of (10e) represent
the tariffs collected from consumers and producers, respectively. The terms in the right-hand-side are the fixed and variable
costs of the network expansion. The decision variables of the upper level problem are um, b
F
m,j , τm, p
D
t,k, and p
G
t,p. The terms
dt,k, gt,p, and ft,m are the lower level optimal values, corresponding to the term x
∗ in (9).
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4.1.2. Lower Level
The lower level problem is a standard market clearing problem, e.g. day-ahead market, for each time t ∈ T . As long as
the clearing problems are independent, a single program spanning over all time periods can be formulated as follows:
max
dt,k,gt,p,ft,m
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
( ∑
k∈ΩDt,n
pDt,kdt,k −
∑
p∈ΩGt,n
pGt,pgt,p
)
(11a)
dt,k ≤ d
max
t,k ∀t ∈ T , ∀k ∈ Ω
D
t [ϕ
D,max
t,k ≥ 0] (11b)
gt,p ≤ g
max
t,p ∀t ∈ T , ∀p ∈ Ω
G
t [ϕ
G,max
t,p ≥ 0] (11c)∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dt,k −
∑
p∈ΩGt,n
gt,p +
∑
m∈M
am,nft,m = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N [πt,n ∈ R] (11d)
∑
m∈M
ψℓ,mft,m = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀ℓ ∈ L [γt,ℓ ∈ R] (11e)
ft,m ≤ F
0
m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF¯m,j ∀t ∈ T , ∀m ∈M [µ
max
t,m ≥ 0] (11f)
− ft,m ≤ F
0
m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF¯m,j ∀t ∈ T , ∀m ∈M [µ
min
t,m ≥ 0] . (11g)
Dual variables are reported in square brackets. The objective function (11a) maximizes the social welfare of the participants,
while accounting for network tariffs as determined by (10c)-(10d). That is, the clearing process is performed by considering
all the costs sustained by participants, in order to properly account for the behaviour of price-elastic consumers and producers
[37, 21]. Constraints (11b)-(11c) impose maximum quantity limits. Condition (11d) represents the power balance in node n
at time t. Note that the dual variable πt,n associated with this constraint represents the market clearing price according to
the marginal pricing framework [36]. Constraint (11e) enforces the Kirchhoff’s voltage law. Finally, constraints (11f)-(11g)
determine the flow limits, where F¯m,j is the lumpy expansion as determined by the upper level. The decision variables of the
lower level problem are dt,k, gt,p, and ft,m. As outlined in Section 4.1, all the upper level variables enter the lower level as
parameters, therefore (11) is a linear program, which is a key property to facilitate resolution of the overall bilevel problem.
5. Resolution method
Bilevel problems like the one presented in (10) and (11) are often solved iteratively, considering a sequential separate
resolution of their upper and lower level until convergence to a fixed point [38]. However, this methodology might be
time consuming and does not ensure convergence. For this reason, in this section we propose a one-shot resolution method
obtained by i) recasting the bilevel problem as a single nonlinear optimization program, ii) introducing a novel and equivalent
reformulation of the congestion rent and iii) using standard integer algebra to remove critical nonlinearities. The final result
of this analytical process is the MILP presented in Appendix C, which can be solved with off-the-shelf solvers.
5.1. Single Level Problem
As stated in Section 4.1.2 the lower level problem (11) is a linear program. As a consequence, it can be equivalently
represented by using its first order necessary and sufficient Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [39]. However, the KKT
complementarity slackness conditions are nonlinear relations. In order to avoid these nonlinearities, the strong duality
property can be used instead of the KKT complementarity slackness conditions. The analytical details for this procedure
are detailed in Appendix A. The key principle is that, for a feasible linear program, the strong duality property holds if
and only if all the complementarity slackness conditions hold [40]. The strong duality requires the equivalence between
the primal and dual objective function values at the optimum, and is reported in (A.4). As a consequence, the proposed
bilevel model can be recast as a single level problem, where the lower level is represented into the upper level by using its
primal constraints (11b)-(11g), its dual constraints (A.1)-(A.3), and the strong duality property (A.4). To summarize, the
bilevel model described in Section 4.1.1 and Section 4.1.2 can be equivalently recast as a single mathematical optimization
program, defined as follows:
max
∑
t∈T
ωt
( ∑
k∈ΩDt
p˜Dt,kdt,k −
∑
p∈ΩGt
p˜Gt,pgt,p
)
−
∑
m∈M
(umK
fix
m +K
var
m
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF¯m,j) (12a)
(10b)− (10f) (12b)
(11b)− (11g) (12c)
(A.1)− (A.3) (12d)
(A.4) (12e)
where (12b) represents the upper level constraints, (12c) and (12d) refer to the lower level primal and dual constraints, and
(12e) is the strong duality property. The decision variables of the single level problem are the upper level variables, and both
the primal and dual lower level variables, i.e., um, b
F
m,j , τm, p
D
t,k, p
G
t,p, dt,k, gt,p, ft,m, ϕ
D,max
t,k , ϕ
G,max
t,p , πt,n, γt,ℓ, µ
max
t,m , µ
min
t,m .
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Note that, by recasting the bilevel problem as a single optimization problem, both lower level primal and dual variables are
accessible within the same optimization problem. This key design feature is exploited to compute the transmission system
operator revenues in (10e). The single level problem (12) is a nonlinear integer program, Section 5.2 and Section 5.3 show
how all the nonlinearities can be removed.
5.2. Congestion rent recast
This section presents an equivalent characterization of the congestion rent, derived through optimality conditions. This
novel result allows us to recast the congestion rent as a linear expression in the presence of lumpy investments. The key
feature of the proposed approach is the use of complementarity conditions to derive an expression of the congestion rent that
does not depend on the flow terms ft,m is a key point. This property will be exploited to recast the whole bilevel problem
as a single MILP program. Indeed, the congestion rent collected by the transmission system operator is defined as follows:∑
m∈M
∑
n∈N
−am,nπt,nft,m , (13)
which is a nonlinear relation, as it involves the products of market prices πt,n and flows ft,m, i.e. two continuous variables.
However, by exploiting complementarity conditions, it is possible to recast (13) in an equivalent formulation, that can be
further rewritten as a linear expression when lumpy expansions are considered, as described in Section 5.3. In detail, from
the dual constraint (A.3), the following relation can be obtained:
−
∑
n∈N
am,nπt,n =
∑
ℓ∈L
ψℓ,mγt,ℓ + µ
max
t,m − µ
min
t,m . (14)
Furthermore, the strong duality property, used to obtain the single level problem in Section 5.1, guarantees that all of the
complementarity slackness conditions hold at the optimum. Therefore, any of these conditions can be used. In particular,
the complementarity slackness conditions related to constraints (11f) and (11g) are defined as follows:
ft,mµ
max
t,m = (F
0
m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF¯m,j)µ
max
t,m (15)
−ft,mµ
min
t,m = (F
0
m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF¯m,j)µ
min
t,m (16)
Therefore, the congestion rent (13) can be recast as follows:
∑
m∈M
∑
n∈N
−am,nπt,nft,m
(14)
=
∑
m∈M
∑
ℓ∈L
ψℓ,mγt,ℓft,m +
∑
m∈M
(µmaxt,m − µ
min
t,m )ft,m
(15)−(16)
=
∑
m∈M
∑
ℓ∈L
ψℓ,mγt,ℓft,m +
∑
m∈M
(F 0m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF¯m,j)(µ
max
t,m + µ
min
t,m )
=
∑
ℓ∈L
γt,ℓ(
∑
m∈M
ψℓ,mft,m) +
∑
m∈M
(F 0m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF¯m,j)(µ
max
t,m + µ
min
t,m )
(11e)
=
∑
m∈M
(F 0m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF¯m,j)(µ
max
t,m + µ
min
t,m ) , (17)
where the first equality is due to (14), the second equality is due to the complementarity conditions (15)-(16), whereas the
last equality is due to the Kirchhoff’s voltage law constraint (11e). Note that the condition (11e) holds for any loop ℓ. This
means that the equivalence obtained in (17) holds not only at system level, but also for any loop ℓ at time t. Furthermore, it
involves only the products of the binary variable bFm,j and the continuous variables µ
max
t,m and µ
min
t,m , which can be linearized
using standard integer algebra, as described in the Section 5.3.
By using (17), the revenue adequacy constraint (10e) can be recast as follows:∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
ωt(F
0
m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF¯m,j)(µ
max
t,m + µ
min
t,m ) +
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
n∈N
ωtumτmδm,n
( ∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dt,k +
∑
p∈ΩGt,n
gt,p
)
≥
∑
m∈M
(umK
fix
m +K
var
m
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF¯m,j) (18)
5.3. MILP model
By using (18) instead of (10e), only two types of nonlinearities remain in the single level problem (12):
1. the products bFm,jµ
max
t,m and b
F
m,jµ
min
t,m involving the binary variable b
F
m,j and the continuous variables µ
max
t,m and µ
min
t,m ,
in (18) and (A.4).
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2. the products umτmdt,k and umτmgt,p involving the binary variable um and the continuous variables τm, dt,k, and gt,p,
in (18) and (A.4). These nonlinearities appear in (A.4) when the conditions (10c) and (10d) are used to replace the
terms pDt,k and p
G
t,p.
The nonlinearities of the first type involve only only the product between one binary variable and one continuous variable,
and can be linearized exactly by using standard integer algebra. For example, the product bx of the binary variable b, and
the continuous variable x with bounds ±M , can be equivalently replaced by introducing an auxiliary continuous bounded
variable y defined as follows:
−Mb ≤ y ≤ +Mb (19)
−M(1− b) ≤ x− y ≤ +M(1− b) . (20)
Therefore, by exploiting (19)-(20), the nonlinear terms bFm,jµ
max
t,m and b
F
m,jµ
min
t,m are removed by introducing the auxiliary
variables yb
Fµ,max
t,m,j and y
bFµ,min
t,m,j , defined in (B.1)-(B.4).
To linearize the second type of nonlinearities, discrete tariff levels are assumed. As a consequence, the term umτm is
replaced by the term
∑
i∈I b
τ
m,iτ¯m,i, with τ¯m,i ∈ R, where i ∈ I represents the number of possible different tariffs for each
line m, with: ∑
i∈I
bτm,i = um ∀m ∈M (21)
bτm,i ∈ {0, 1} ∀m ∈M, ∀i ∈ I . (22)
Therefore, the term umτmdt,k and umτmgt,p are replaced by
∑
i∈I b
τ
m,iτ¯m,idt,k, and
∑
i∈I b
τ
m,iτ¯m,igt,p, respectively. Then,
the product bτm,idt,k and b
τ
m,igt,p, involving one binary and one continuous variable, is removed as in (19)-(20) by introducing
the auxiliary variables yb
τd
t,m,i,k and y
bτg
t,m,i,p defined in (B.5)-(B.8).
Assuming discrete tariff levels, by using (18) instead of (10e), and introducing the constraints (B.1)-(B.8), all the
nonlinearities of the single level program (12) can be removed, and the final optimization problem results in a MILP model,
fully reported in Appendix C, which can be solved with off-the-shelf solvers.
6. Numerical results
The new network planning formulation with ex-ante tariffs is now applied to two different case studies, in order to assess
and discuss its key properties and advantages. The proposed approach is also compared with other models referenced in the
paper. In particular, the following planning approaches are considered:
• Centralized Solution (CS): the standard centralized planning approach, presented in (1).
• Centralized Solution with revenue adequacy (CSR): extension of CS where transmission costs must be fully
recovered from congestion rent. This is described by equations (1) with the additional constraint (5).
• Centralized Solution with revenue adequacy and lumpy expansion (CSR-L): modification of CSR that con-
siders lumpy investment decisions. In this case, the capacity expansion Fm on each line m can only take a finite set
of values in F¯m. Therefore, it is described by (1), (5) and the following additional constraint:
Fm ∈ F¯m, ∀m ∈ M. (23)
• Tariff Solution (TS): the new planning paradigm with ex-ante dynamic tariffs presented in this paper, which is fully
reported in Appendix C.
In the reported studies, the MILP model of the TS has been implemented in Python 3.6 with Pyomo 5.6 [41], and solved
with CPLEX 12.8 [42] on a 16-core Intel Xeon CPU, with 32GB of RAM. To guarantee the optimality of the solution, the
absolute and relative Cplex gaps are set to zero.
6.1. 2-node system
The 2-node network represented in Fig. 1 and analysed in Section 2.1 is now further discussed. Recall that the fixed
cost is assumed equal to Kfixm = 200 £/h and the variable cost is set to K
var
m = 10 £/MWh. The set of lumpy capacity
expansions used for both the CSR-L and the TS model is F¯m = {3, 6, 9, . . . 30}. The demand and supply profiles are fully
reported in Fig. 2. Table 1 reports the solutions associated to each of the four considered investment schemes, i.e. CS, CSR,
CSR-L, and TS. The CS proposes investment on a line of capacity Fm = 25 MW, as graphically represented in Fig. 3. This
centralized approach leads to a net increase of 425 £/h in the social welfare of the system with respect to the initial no-line
scenario. The total investment cost required to achieve this result is equal to 450 £/h, which can be disaggregated into the
variable cost Kvarm Fm = 250 £/h and fixed cost K
fix
m = 200 £/h. The proper recovery and allocation of this cost remains
an open problem. As discussed in Section 2.1, the congestion rent CR in the expanded network is equal to 250 £/h and only
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covers variable costs, causing a revenue imbalance of −200 £/h. One possibility to recover this remaining cost term is the
introduction of ex-post tariffs, i.e. additional payments to be made by demand and generators in exchange for benefiting of
the new line. However, as discussed in Section 2.3, this can lead to a negative surplus for some participants. In addition, it
disincentives truthful biddings, as shown in [23]. In other words, the CS approach, with social welfare increase of 425 £/h,
does not properly address the key issue of full cost recovery for the network expansion.
The alternative approach considered in CSR is to explicitly impose full cost recovery by using the collected congestion
rent, through the additional constraint (5). Comparison between CS and CSR shows the following:
• A smaller expansion of Fm = 20 MW is performed in the CSR case, as represented in Fig. 5.
• The underinvestment leads to a higher price differential between the two areas.
• This increases the congestion rent to 400 £/h, which now fully covers the investment costs, i.e. the variable cost
Kvarm Fm = 200 £/h plus the fixed cost K
fix
m = 200 £/h.
• The underinvestment reduces the net social welfare increase, which in the CSR is equal to 400 £/h (compared to 425
£/h in the CS case).
To summarize, the CRS is able to ensure full cost recovery by using exclusively the collected congestion rent. However, this
is achieved at the cost of a reduced social welfare.
The drawbacks of the CRS are exacerbated in the CRS-L scenario, when lumpy investments are considered and the
capacity expansion of the line can only take a finite number of values. In this case, the line expansion is smaller and equal
to Fm = 18 MW (see Fig. 6), since the value of 20 MW of the CSR case cannot be selected. This implies that the collected
congestion rent increase even further to 432 £/h, leading to a positive revenue imbalance of +52 £/h (red area in Fig. 6).
As expected, the CRS-L has a smaller net benefit increase of the overall social welfare, which amounts to only 376 £/h.
Finally, the last row in Table 1 reports the solution obtained by using the proposed TS approach. In this case, the
selected network expansion Fm = 21 MW is greater than the one in both the CSR and CSR-L case. As a result, the smaller
congestion rent of 371 £/h does not fully cover the investment costs of 410 £/h. The remaining difference of 39 £/h is
obtained by applying a tariff τ = 0.357 /MWh. This corresponds to a price increase in demand payments (and a price
decrease for generation revenues). In other words, demand and generation sustain an additional cost in exchange for the
(greater) benefits of the expanded line. A key advantage of this approach is the greater net increase in social welfare (equal
to 409£/h) with respect to CSR and CSR-L. This is obtained by introducing an additional degree of freedom in the problem
of recovering investment costs: through the introduction of the tariff τ , these costs are not entirely covered by the congestion
rent but can in part be sustained by the agents (demand and generation) which benefit from the investment. Notice that
the distribution of the cost recovery (between congestion rent and demand/generation payments) is determined by τ , which
is chosen with the purpose of maximizing the overall social welfare in (10a).
Table 1: Results of different network expansion schemes applied to the 2-node system.
Reference
model
Expansion
Fm (or F¯m,j)
Social Welfare
increase
Investment
Cost
Congestion
Rent
Tariff
τm
Tariff
Payments
Revenue
imbalance
CS 25 425 450 250 0 0 -200
CSR 20 400 400 400 0 0 0
CSR-L 18 376 380 432 0 0 52
TS 21 409 410 371 0.357 39 0
6.2. Garver’s 6-node system
The comparison of the different investment strategies is now extended to a more complex network with a significantly
larger number of generators and consumers. The case study is based on the Garver’s 6-node system depicted in Fig. 10 [43].
This network has 6 nodes and 8 lines, i.e. N = {1, . . . , 6} andM = {1, . . . , 8}. The solid lines from 1 to 6 in Fig. 10 represent
existing branches that can be expanded, i.e. F 0m > 0 for all m ∈ {1, . . . , 6}. The dashed lines 7 and 8 are new branches that
can be built, i.e. F 0m = 0 for m ∈ {7, 8}. In this example, two time periods T = {1, 2} are considered. To properly depict
elastic market curves, 1000 consumers and 1000 generators are considered at each node, with the exception of node 6, where
only generators are present. The values of p˜Dt,k and p˜
G
t,p are sampled from a normal distribution with mean 50 £/MWh
and standard deviation 10 £/MWh. The limits dmaxt,k and g
max
t,p on demand and supply bids are obtained from an uniform
distribution ranging from zero to 500 kW. The set of lumpy capacity expansions is defined as F¯m ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , 200}. The
line reactance, existing capacity F 0m, and variable cost K
var
m are reported for each branch in Fig. 10. The fixed investment
cost is Kfixm = 100 £/h for all m ∈ M.
Table 2 reports the solutions associated to each of the four considered schemes (i.e., CS, CSR, CSR-L and TS). The
optimal solution obtained by using the CS scheme shows that only the lines 7 and 8 are built, with F¯7 = 55.51 MW and
F¯8 = 44.27 MW, leading to a welfare of 21774.38 £/h. The total investment cost amounts to 499.3 £/h, given by the fixed
investment cost of Kfixm = 100 £/h and K
var
m = 3 £/MWh for both the lines. In this case, the congestion rent is 299.3 £/h
and, as expected, it exactly covers the variable investment costs, but not the fixed costs. As a result, the revenue imbalance
is negative, and equal to −200 £/h. In order to ensure the recovery of all the investment costs, the CRS scheme with the
13
Figure 10: Garver’s 6-node network topology.
additional revenue adequacy constraint (5) is considered, with the associated solution reported in the second row of Table 2.
In this case, as one would expect, the line expansions are smaller: line 7 is built with F¯7 = 50.15 MW, whereas line 8 is
built with F¯8 = 39.91 MW. As a result, the welfare decreases to 21762.54 £. However, due to the underinvestment, the
congestion rent rises to 470.2 £/h, and exactly covers all the investment costs. When the set of lumpy capacity expansions
F¯m ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , 200} is considered in the CSR-L scheme, the social welfare decreases even further. In this case, line 7 is
built with F¯7 = 50 MW, whereas line 8 is built with F¯8 = 40 MW. As a result of lumpiness, a lower value of social welfare
is obtained (21762.39 £) and extra-profit is collected by the transmission operator, leading to a strictly positive revenue
imbalance of 1.6 £/h.
The last row in Table 2 reports the solution associated to the proposed scheme TS with ex-ante network tariffs. In this
case, line 7 is built with F¯7 = 53 MW, whereas line 8 is built with F¯8 = 48 MW. Three main elements should be emphasized
in this case:
• The social welfare is equal to 21765.11 £/h and it is greater than both the CSR-L and CSR cases.
• By imposing an ex-ante tariff equal to 0.0419 £/MWh and directly recovering part of the investment costs from
generators and customers, the TS avoids the negative revenue imbalance arising in the CS scenario.
• The CSR and the TS have both a revenue imbalance (i.e. the surplus of the transmission operator) equal to zero. This
means that, in the TS, the increase in social welfare with respect to the CRS case is entirely collected by consumers and
producers. In other words, despite the additional tariff payment, the condition of the market participants improves
thanks to the optimal distribution of the investment cost recovery between the tariff and congestion rent component.
Table 2: Results of different network expansion schemes applied to the Garver’s 6-node system.
Reference
Model
Expansion Social
Welfare
Investment
Cost
Congestion
Rent
Tariff Tot. Tariff
Payments
Revenue
ImbalanceF7 F8 τ7 τ8
CS 55.51 44.27 21774.38 499.3 299.3 0 0 0 -200
CSR 50.15 39.91 21762.54 470.2 470.2 0 0 0 0
CSR-L 50.00 40.00 21762.39 470.0 471.6 0 0 0 1.6
TS 53.00 48.00 21765.11 503.0 275.2 0.0419 0.0419 227.8 0
7. Conclusion
Current paradigms for the recovery of investment costs in transmission network planning exhibit substantial issues. In
particular, the use of ex-post network tariffs can lead to several inefficiencies in the form of cleared orders with a negative
surplus and mistrustful biddings. These problems are also exacerbated by the current trends of increasing price-elasticity of
demand. To overcome these issues, the proposed approach introduces ex-ante dynamic network tariffs, which can be exactly
embodied in the market participants’ submitted bids before the market clearing actually takes place, and are directly related
to the cleared quantity. These ex-ante tariffs are incorporated in a novel formulation of the long-term network planning
problem which returns the optimized network investments and, at the same time, determines the optimal repartition of the
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associated costs between congestion revenues and tariff payments. Case studies demonstrate that this new approach is able
to increase social welfare with respect to alternative planning methods with revenue adequacy constraints and, at the same
time, ensures full recovery of the network investment costs. Further work will investigate more complex formulations of the
ex-ante tariffs, evaluating how different allocation factors and tariff specifications affect the optimal network expansion and
the fairness of cost repartition. In particular, a comparison with existing tariff allocation approaches, such as the flow-based
MW-mile method, are the subject of an ongoing companion paper.
Appendix A. Dual constraints and strong duality
The dual constraints of the lower level problem (11) are defined as follows. In particular, the dual constraints of the
primal variables dt,k ≥ 0 and gt,p ≥ 0 are, respectively:
ϕ
D,max
t,k + πt,n ≥ p
D
t,k ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N , ∀k ∈ Ω
D
t,n (A.1)
ϕ
G,max
t,p − πt,n ≥ −p
G
t,p ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N , ∀p ∈ Ω
G
t,n , (A.2)
The dual constraint associated with the flow variable ft,m ∈ R is defined as:∑
n∈N
am,nπt,n +
∑
ℓ∈L
ψℓ,mγt,ℓ + µ
max
t,m − µ
min
t,m = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀m ∈ M . (A.3)
The strong duality property of the lower level problem (11) requires the equivalence between the primal and dual objective
function values, and is defined as follows:
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
( ∑
k∈ΩDt,n
pDt,kdt,k −
∑
p∈ΩGt,n
pGt,pgt,p
)
=
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈ΩDt
ϕ
D,max
t,k d
max
t,k +
∑
t∈T
∑
p∈ΩGt
ϕ
G,max
t,p g
max
t,p +
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
(
F 0m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF¯m,j
)(
µmaxt,m + µ
min
t,m
)
(A.4)
Appendix B. Auxiliary constraints
The following constraints are used to define to the auxiliary variables yb
Fµ,max
t,m,j and y
bFµ,min
t,m,j
0 ≤ yb
Fµ,max
t,m,j ≤Mb
F
m,j ∀t ∈ T , ∀m ∈ M, ∀j ∈ J (B.1)
0 ≤ µmaxt,m − y
bFµ,max
t,m,j ≤M(1− b
F
m,j) ∀t ∈ T , ∀m ∈ M, ∀j ∈ J (B.2)
0 ≤ yb
Fµ,min
t,m,j ≤Mb
F
m,j ∀t ∈ T , ∀m ∈ M, ∀j ∈ J (B.3)
0 ≤ µmint,m − y
bFµ,min
t,m,j ≤M(1− b
F
m,j) ∀t ∈ T , ∀m ∈ M, ∀j ∈ J , (B.4)
where M is set equal to the maximum allowed bid price.
The following constraints are used to define to the auxiliary variables yb
τd
t,m,i,k and y
bτg
t,m,i,p
0 ≤ yb
τd
t,m,i,k ≤ d
max
t,k b
τ
m,i ∀t ∈ T , ∀m ∈M, ∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ Ω
D
t (B.5)
0 ≤ dt,k − y
bτd
t,m,i,k ≤ d
max
t,k (1− b
τ
m,i) ∀t ∈ T , ∀m ∈M, ∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ Ω
D
t (B.6)
0 ≤ yb
τg
t,m,i,p ≤ g
max
t,p b
τ
m,i ∀t ∈ T , ∀m ∈M, ∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ Ω
G
t (B.7)
0 ≤ gt,p − y
bτg
t,m,i,p ≤ g
max
t,p (1− b
τ
m,i) ∀t ∈ T , ∀m ∈M, ∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ Ω
G
t (B.8)
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Appendix C. Final MILP model
The following appendix reports the complete MILP model after that all the nonlinearities have been removed.
max
∑
t∈T
ωt
( ∑
k∈ΩDt
p˜Dt,kdt,k −
∑
p∈ΩGt
p˜Gt,pgt,p
)
−
∑
m∈M
(
umK
fix
m +K
var
m
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF¯m,j
)
(C.1)
s.t.
(10b) (C.2)∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
ωtF
0
m(µ
max
t,m + µ
min
t,m ) +
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
j∈J
ωtF¯m,j(y
bFµ,max
t,m,j + y
bFµ,min
t,m,j )
+
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
∑
m∈M
∑
i∈I
ωtτ¯m,iδm,n
( ∑
k∈ΩDt,n
yb
τd
t,m,i,k +
∑
p∈ΩGt,n
y
bτg
t,m,i,p
)
≥
∑
m∈M
(
umK
fix
m +K
var
m
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF¯m,j
)
(C.3)
(11b)− (11g) (C.4)
ϕ
D,max
t,k + πt,n ≥ p˜
D
t,k −
∑
m∈M
∑
i∈I
bτm,iτ¯m,iδm,n ∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N , ∀k ∈ Ω
D
t,n (C.5)
ϕ
G,max
t,p − πt,n ≥ −
(
p˜Gt,p +
∑
m∈M
∑
i∈I
bτm,iτ¯m,iδm,n
)
∀t ∈ T , ∀n ∈ N , ∀p ∈ ΩGt,n (C.6)
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(
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ϕ
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+
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t∈T
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m∈M
F 0m(µ
max
t,m + µ
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t,m ) +
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
j∈J
F¯m,j(y
bFµ,max
t,m,j + y
bFµ,min
t,m,j ) (C.8)
(21)− (22) (C.9)
(B.1)− (B.8) (C.10)
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